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Introduction 
 
Every culture and epoch has had its ideas about the nature of mind and existence. We can reflect upon 
ourselves, upon others, and upon the world. Do animals do that too? Do they sit around and think that 
they are because they can think? Are they to be considered mindless if they do not reflect? How did our 
ability to think beyond the immediately present evolve? 
The self-awareness implied by ‘cogito ergo sum’, or ‘I think, therefore I am’, demands a 
reflective level of thinking that develops by about age four in children. Only then, recent research 
suggests, do children begin to reflect on their own mental states. It would be quite difficult, however, to 
convince people that younger children are mindless – mind can surely exist without being able to reflect 
upon its own existence. One can know, regardless of whether one knows that one knows. This means 
that the Cartesian assumption that the mind is necessarily transparent to the self is flawed (cf. Wimmer 
and Hartl 1991; Gopnik 1993). Instead, the reflective mind, or what I want to call the metamind, seems 
to depend on mental computations that gradually develop over the first four years of life and that have 
evolved over the last five million years of human evolution. 
Rather than being given by God, as Descartes would have had it, metamind is the product of 
natural selection. It is not a basic starting block, but the product of a long process of cognitive evolution. 
The fundamental problem to be addressed is how, from a time when there was no consciousness on 
Earth, mind developed to the phenomenological experiences we have today. While physical features 
such as bipedal locomotion, the opposable thumb, increased cranial size, and stone-tool production mark 
important developments in human evolution, I maintain that it was the evolution of mind that takes 
prime responsibility for the extraordinary story of the human species. 
In this chapter I will attempt to outline the natural history of the human mind, with special 
reference the emergence of representational skills. There are several evolutionary proposals that are in 
parts similar to the one that will be presented here (e.g. Lorenz 1973; Bischof 1985; Tulving 1985; 
Humphrey 1986, 1992; Whiten and Byrne 1991; Olson 1993; Dennett 1995). Perner (1991) 
proposed perhaps the most influential account of children’s growing representational skills. I 
will extend and update Perner’s developmental model and apply it to evolution. From this 
model one can derive various testable hypotheses about children’s development and about other 
animals’ capacities. I will show that there is a general fit to the data and that this model is very 
useful for understanding the basic progression in the evolution of the hominid mind. 
Perner (1991) suggested that children’s understanding of mind reflects their level of 
understanding representation in general. In brief, his theory suggests that children advance in 
conceptual capacity from the ability to form (1) primary representations of reality, to (2) 
entertaining secondary representations beyond current reality (e.g. representing past, future, or 
imaginary objects or events; or representing the representational content of other 
representational systems), to (3) understanding representational relations themselves-or in other 
words, metarepresenting representations as representations. This progression, which may seem 
confusing at first, can be illustrated with the example of understanding the representational 
nature of television. With primary representations one can merely perceive the reality of the TV 
image as a quickly colour-changing set of dots or as two-dimensional shapes that might be 
mistaken for the objects they resemble. Following these pictures in terms of the 3-D characters 
and events they represent means creating secondary representations (i.e., the content of the TV 
image is represented). With metarepresentation, one can further appreciate that this is just 
television (an American soap, say, with lots of bad acting). At this level, then, one can 
simultaneously follow the programme and evaluate whether the story is true or fictional, 
whether the editing is good or bad, and whether the actor always has this funny accent. 
The mind can be regarded as a representational system (cf. Dretske 1995). Under-
standing mind might develop in the same fashion as understanding other representational 
systems such as televisions. For example, with primary representation one simply perceives 
other’s actions. With secondary representations these actions can be interpreted in terms of 
what the person wants, intends, or pretends (i.e., in terms of not directly perceivable mental 
states). Only with metarepresentation, however, can one appreciate that these mental states are 
just representations. One can simultaneously entertain somebody else’s beliefs and evaluate 
them as true or false, and wonder whether the other wants to deceive or how one could change 
his or her mind. 
Children, animals, and human ancestors can, according to my model, be categorized in 
terms of their level of representational capacity (see Table 12.1). The representational level 
determines what an organism can mentally conceive of. With primary representations an animal 
can form only a single updating model of reality. With secondary representations the organism 
can entertain multiple models. That is to say, in addition to a model of current reality, such an 
organism can consider models representing past, future, or hypothetical situations. 
Furthermore, it can interpret the representational content of other representational systems (e.g. 
a picture or someone’s pretend play). Because the different models can be compared I refer to 
this mentality as the collating mind. Finally, with metarepresentations an individual can form 
metamodels. The representational relations themselves can be represented (new ones can even 
be invented). With this capacity the individual can conceive concurrently of different ways the 
same object or event can be represented (e.g., by different people, by different media, by different plans, 
in different times, etc.). This capacity to form reflective metamodels is the cornerstone of metamind, 
which, I propose, further entails the ability to dissociate from primary perceptions and response 
tendencies to create a distinct level of mental executive control over actions. Metamind, I will argue, is 
uniquely human and at the root of humans’ extraordinary position in the animal kingdom. 
 
Table 12.1. A model of the natural history of the representational mind 
 
 Primary mind Collating mind Metamind 
Model of reality single updating model multiple models metamodels 
Representational primary representation secondary representation, metarepresentation, 
level  representing representing 
  representations representations as 
   representations. 
Evolution >150 million years ago ~ 15 million years ago ~ 1.5 million years ago 
 birds, mammals great apes H. erectus/ergaster, humans 
Development fetus end of infancy pre-schooler 
 (~ 30 weeks) (~ 1.5 years) (~ 3.5 years) 
Characteristics sensation, perception, plus secondary plus metarepresentation, 
 emotion, schemes, representation executive control 
 instincts, reflexes,   
 conditioning ...   
High play, exploration, pretence, planning, theory of mind, mental time 
expressions and latent learning insight, self-awareness, travel, symbolic 
applications  other awareness, representation, 
  attribution of desire and generativity, creativity, 
  intention teleology... 
Resulting culture no culture but nature simple tool cultures, mimesis, morality, religion, 
  basic politics language, narrativity, 
   history, science... 
 
 
I acknowledge that any attempt at reconstructing the evolution of mind is inevitably an 
outrageous simplification. The story I will tell encompasses and connects recent findings from various 
research fields, to create a plausible and coherent – perhaps even true – account of the evolution of the 
representational mind. But a couple of hundred citations in the reference list merely scratch the surface 
of the complex debates in the disciplines. So even if I succeed at constructing a harmonious 
interdisciplinary picture, it is only one of several possible interpretations. Furthermore, to answer the 
question as to how we got to where we are now, I will need to employ two controversial strategies – I 
shall argue from currently living organisms to ancestral organisms, and from ontogeny (development) to 
phylogeny (evolution). Both of these strategies require some justification. 
The main problem with arguing from living to ancestral species is one of deciding what features 
are based on common ancestry. Functionally or structurally similar phenotypes can depend on either 
homology or analogy. The decision between them is sometimes difficult to make, especially when it 
comes to behaviour and underlying cognition. For example, I observed a sub-adult male orang-
utan maintaining in a horizontal position between two trees until a juvenile climbed down the 
trunk and used him as a living bridge. Ants can also be observed to build such bridges. Does 
the bridging behaviour indicate some level of self-awareness in orangs (cf., Povinelli and Cant 
1995) but not in ants? The decision should be based on what I want to call evolutionary 
parsimony. Parsimony usually refers to Lloyd Mogan’s canon which proclaims that we should 
use no higher level explanation for behaviour than is strictly necessary. Unfortunately, it is not 
at all clear what constitutes a higher and what a lower level of explanation. Evolutionary 
parsimony, however, can be defined more readily. We should favour the phylogenetic scenario 
that requires the least number of assumptions to explain the current phenotypes of species. For 
example, if all species of a particular family share a feature, it is more parsimonious to assume 
that they share that feature because a common ancestor had it, than to postulate that each 
species developed that feature independently. On the other hand, if two distantly related species 
(such as orangs and ants) share a feature that is not present in closer relatives, then it is more 
parsimonious to assume that the feature developed through convergent evolution, because 
otherwise one would have to assume that each of the closer related species had lost that feature 
during evolution. In this chapter, this reasoning will be applied chiefly in the context of 
similarities between humans and our closest relatives, the other great apes. Features shared 
between all these species are probably homologous and thus were present in our common 
ancestor some 12 to 15 million years ago. While analogous features can tell us something about 
selective pressures, only homologous features suggest that the same underlying mechanism is at 
work. Human characteristics not shared with our closest relatives, not even with the 
chimpanzees, most likely evolved after our ancestry split from the line that led to modern 
chimpanzees and have therefore emerged in the last five million years. 
The second controversial strategy is to reason from development to evolution. 
Haeckel’s notion that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny has long been rejected. There appear to 
be as many cases violating this ‘rule’ as following it (e.g. Parker and Gibson 1978). However, 
this should not stop us from using developmental information to construct hypotheses about 
evolutionary history (see also Donald, this volume). From a state of no mind, a mind capable of 
reasoning cogito ergo sum evolved in phylogeny, and the same metamorphosis also occurs in 
the development of an individual human. For our discussion it is mainly the fact that one has to 
be able to form primary representations before one can form secondary representations, and 
secondary representations before one can form metarepresentations, that will be mapped from 
ontogeny onto phylogeny. My model predicts that various capacities and skills should co-
emerge both in development or in evolution, because in both cases their emergence reflects the 
two representational transitions. Thus, recent empirical findings of developmental associations 
between markers of each representational level and other skills bear on the debate as to when 
these skills could have made their debut in evolutionary history. 
Finally, the stage-like model I present does not imply strong claims about abrupt 
quantum leaps. The development and evolution of mental skills is a gradual process, but 
qualitative changes can emerge from gradual changes, just as water changes qualitatively from 
solid to liquid to gas as temperature gradually increases. Potentials and characteristics change 
in each qualitatively new level (cf. Lorenz 1973; Bischof 1985). I shall propose that, in 
children, the change from primary mind to the collating mind occurs at approximately age one 
and a half, and the change from collating mind to metamind occurs at approximately age three 
and a half. The corresponding changes in hominid evolution, I suggest, occurred approximately 
15 million and approximately one and a half million years ago, respectively. However, the new 
skills might at first be crude; application and generalization might involve inconsistencies and 
might generally invoke a picture of gradual transition. Yet, if only to contribute to an easier 
understanding, I believe it to be useful to model this development as a simplified stage-like 
progression. Thus, I shall present the model in a three-stage manner-first discussing primary 
mind, then the collating mind, and finally the metamind. 
I will place special emphasis on the emergence of metamind and its corollaries and 
present relevant findings from my own research. This change to metamind, I suggest, began in 
Homo erectus/ergaster about 1.5 million years ago. It marked the dawn of a new self-reflective 
force that challenged instincts and simple stimulus-response learning for the driver’s seat of 
behaviour. Once it emerged, the metamind was to change the face of the Earth. It is so powerful 
(creative, self-aware, and communicative) that it might help life itself to spread beyond the 
boundaries of the planet; so powerful, on the other hand, that it might destroy the whole 
enterprise of life on Earth. 
 
 
The primary mind 
 
Evolution of mind 
 
Before discussing the evolution of complex representational abilities, I must briefly outline the 
basic assumptions about the origin of mind. During evolution more complex levels arose out of, 
and are ultimately dependent upon, less complex levels of organization while at the same time 
being profoundly different from those levels. Physical evolution gave rise to biological 
evolution, which gave rise to mental evolution, which gave rise to cultural evolution. 
Various regulating mechanisms preceded mind, or mental functions, in biological 
evolution. Living organisms, by their very definition, reproduce, have metabolism, and respond 
to environmental change. These characteristics can be achieved by varied processes including 
regulating cycles and hard-wired response patterns. The entire plant world seems to run on such 
processes. Behaviour in early animals might also have been largely based on innate processes 
like today’s instincts, reflexes, and other “innate releasing mechanisms” (Lorenz 1973) that 
filter the environmental stimuli and select the appropriate response. Even modification of 
innate response patterns during an individual’s life-span can be achieved through classical 
conditioning, habituation, sensitization etc., and these are usually not regarded as affording 
anything mental (but see Lea, this volume). 
Mental experience might have first emerged with the evolution of reinforceable 
plasticity. Dennett (1995) calls organisms with this capacity `Skinnerian Creatures’. The organism 
performs various actions and then selects the one `that works’ or that is `reinforced’. This is natural 
selection extended to the individual behavioural level. The selection process, however, is not within 
the environment but within the individual. Which environmental stimuli are reinforcing is ultimately a 
function of what the organism evaluates as ‘good’ or `bad’. The same stimulus may be good for one 
creature and bad for another; good today and bad tomorrow. But how does the individual `know’ what 
is good and what is bad, and why should it bother? These are surprisingly important questions that 
bear on the evolution of mind. Dennett (1995) suggests that some early candidates for this category 
`were no better off than their hard-wired cousins, since they had no way of favouring (selecting for an 
encore) the behavioural options they were equipped to `try out’, but others, we might suppose, were 
fortunate enough to have wired-in `reinforcers’ that happened to favour Smart Moves, actions that 
were better for their agents’ (p. 374). 
But how are the ‘wired-in reinforcers’ of those lucky creatures supposed to work? In our 
experience something is positively reinforcing if it `feels good’. Perhaps the mind or mental 
experience evolved for this very reason-to represent certain stimuli as feel-goods, or, if they happen 
to be negative reinforcers, feel-bads. According to Humphrey (1992), evolution favoured organisms 
with affect-laden sensitivity (this is good versus this is bad) to events at their boundaries. Organisms 
evolved interests. Leahy (1994) traces this argument back to William James (1890) who claimed 
that consciousness evolved to make survival an imperative rather than a chance rule. `Minding’ 
created the adaptive striving for survival that marks the vertebrate world. 
The legacy of Descartes’ philosophy is a popular idea of mind that is far too intellectualized. 
As Milan Kundera (1991) put it: “ ‘I think therefore I am’ is the statement of an intellectual who 
underrates toothache” (p. 200). Humphrey’s (1992) alternative – `I feel therefore I am’ – might come 
closer to the true essence of mind. That ‘to feel’ is the essence of consciousness is reflected in the 
everyday use of the word. Losing consciousness means more than being unable to think or reason, it 
means being unable to feel. Just as well, because being unconscious is supposed to mean that one 
cannot feel anything when one is cut open on an operating table. 
Basic to Humphrey’s (1992) analysis is the distinction between sensation (what is happening 
to me) and perception (what is happening out there), and the insight that sensations or feelings are the 
product of active neuronal processes separate from those producing perception. He cites phenomena 
such as blindsight and agnosia to make his case for a double dissociation between sensation and 
perception. The distinct activity of sensing, the logic goes, involves a reactivating loop with a 
particular duration in projection areas of the central nervous system, creating a subjective experience 
of sensation. The projection areas have a correspondence with the site of stimulation at the organism’s 
boundary that determines the characteristic modality of the sensation. Sensation with an attached 
positive or negative evaluation is the fundamental non-intellectual assessment machinery which can 
be expected to be present in any organism with sufficiently developed sensory projection areas. 
Higher vertebrates such as birds and mammals are probably capable of this feat. They mind! 
This assumption is substantiated by the resemblance of those animals’ behaviour to the kinds 
of human behaviour that we ordinarily describe as based on feelings. Dogs, horses, and cats seem to 
enjoy being stroked and dislike being pinched, much as we do. This phenotypical 
correspondence is most likely of homologous rather than of analogous origin. That is, there is 
no apparent reason why convergent evolution, rather than ancestry, should have produced such 
strikingly similar phenotypes in all mammalian species. That in turn means that, just as we can 
assume that other people experience pain the way we do (e.g. when we see them scream while 
being hit), so too can we assume, with much the same certainty, that mammals (and birds and 
possibly some other species) experience pain when we see them `scream’ while being hit. 
These creatures are sentient beings. 
Nonetheless, the evolution and nature of feeling remain controversial. We do not need 
to resolve that controversy here. For my model of the evolution of representational skills it is 
the second kind of organismic information-processing that is important. 
Perception is how the organism uses sensory information to gain knowledge about the 
outside world. This, of course, is of immense adaptive value. An organism that can respond 
appropriately to stimuli that indicate the proximity of, say, food or a predator, before that 
external object comes in direct contact with the body surface has an adaptive advantage. 
Organisms with highly fallible indication systems are soon starved or eaten. So, evolution 
favoured those with increasingly sophisticated and fine-grained categories for indicating 
stimuli of significant external events. Sensory organs became the means of inferring the state of 
the outside world. Stimulation of these specialized areas of the body surface (e.g. the retina) 
was used decreasingly for sensation and increasingly for perception. Some surface areas, such 
as the skin on our hands, maintained a double function of sensation (when being stroked) and 
perception (when touching objects). At specialized perception areas like the retina, however, 
the stimulation is no longer evaluated simply as `feels good’ or `feels bad’. It is the 
configuration of the stimuli and what they indicate that is evaluated emotionally. Furthermore, 
perception does not happen to a tabula rasa. Animals form concepts, and concepts guide 
perception. These processes require an integrating central processor. 
The brain processes the constantly changing incoming information to create a relatively 
stable picture of the environment. Size, shape, and colour constancy are formidable 
computational achievements that ensure that an object is perceived as one continuing object. 
Cross-modal integration of sensory information is an even greater achievement. Auditory, 
olfactory, and visual inputs are all taken as indicators of one and the same object in the 
environment. The brain creates a single integrating model of the outside world. All major 
primate groups have been shown to have cross-modal abilities (Ettlinger and Wilson 1990). 
We can call this mental model, created by perception, a representation, since the inner 
and outer worlds are matched according to definable rules. Because it is an integrating model, it 
is not entirely stimulus-bound, as is often suggested. Indeed, a mental model might not only 
integrate information across modalities but also across time. If a cat were to stop hunting as 
soon as its prey disappeared behind a bush, it would have a very inefficient mental model 
indeed. This, of course, does not happen. The mental model maintains a representation of the 
prey as being behind the bush until there is new information displacing it (e.g. the prey re-
emerges on the other side). Bischof (1985) called this capacity diachronic identity, as the 
mental model bridges past, present, and future, albeit to a very limited extent. The main 
limitation is that we are talking about a single model of reality that is constantly updated (cf. 
Perner 1991). 
The ancestors of today’s vertebrates were already armed with these devices of 
sensation, perception, and representation, and so exploited the potential design space to evolve 
in their diverse ways. Thus, what I present here as one basic category of mind is a very 
heterogenous class with very diverse degrees of sophistication, all of which are equally 
successful adaptations. They all share the same fundamental characteristics of mind, but 
lumping them into one category does their diversity an injustice. This rough treatment is 
inevitable, though, given the scope of this chapter and its primary focus on mental evolution in 
hominids. 
There are two further refinements I wish to highlight because they lead up to the next 
level of representational capacity. One is curiosity. Some species developed active ways of 
improving their internal conception of the environment, and thus improving the information 
contained in the model. Exploratory behaviour is used to gather information about the 
environment, but the animal only engages in it in the absence of any competing serious 
motivation. A rat, for example, explores a maze and, when a stimulus elicits a flight response, 
uses the information gained to directly choose the most appropriate escape route. Such latent 
learning does not involve any operant conditioning but is a pre-emptive measure. The single 
updating mental model is enlarged to cover a wider spectrum of the current situation, including 
routes through the maze, by the information gathered through exploration. This is specifically 
adaptive for unstable or diverse environments, because it provides the information necessary 
for flexible appropriate responses in novel situations. It is not surprising therefore to find this 
trait especially in what Lorenz (1973) called the “specialists in non-specialization.... the rats 
from among the rodents, corvids from among the song birds, and man [sic] from among the 
primates” (p. 148). 
Closely related to curiosity is play. Playing animals not only acquire information about 
the environment but also train their responses to it. Just as in exploratory behaviour, the 
organism usually stops the play activity when serious threats or motivations (e.g. hunger) 
emerge. This suggests that the action is implicitly tagged as a ‘non-serious’ drive only to be 
followed in the absence of `serious’ motives. Learning activities such as play or exploration are 
inherently future-oriented and lead up to the next level of representational thought. But first we 
need to consider human development. 
 
Development of mind 
 
How did we develop from a non-conscious cell to a minding, perceiving, playing, and 
exploring infant? From the moment of birth, human infants seem to feel and to perceive the 
world, albeit in limited ways. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the child `minds’ long 
before it is born. Prenatal voice recognition and other effects suggest such early developments 
(e.g. DeCasper and Spence 1986). While electrical activity above the brainstem starts to emerge 
from the 14th week after conception, it is not until the 30th week that cortical electrical activity 
is recorded. It is not clear when exactly the sensory projection areas of the fetal brain have matured 
enough to produce the reverberatory loops that, according to Humphrey (1992), produce sensation, and 
it will not become clear until we have identified the precise nature of these proposed neural loops in the 
mature brain. But it is clearly some time before birth, and in medical practice painkillers are now being 
used for the fetus in prenatal surgery, in apparent recognition that the sentient mind begins its 
development before birth (cf. Concar 1996). 
There is early evidence for the existence of a single updating mental model (Perner 1991). From 
birth the infant seems capable of cross-modal integration, as is evident through imitation of facial 
expression (Meltzoff and Gopnik 1989). And by three months the time-bridging capacity becomes 
evident. Baillargeon has shown in several experiments that three- to four-month-old infants represent an 
object that is no longer perceptible (Baillargeon 1987; Baillargeon and DeVos 1991). The infants show 
significant signs of surprise when viewing a screen that appears to move through the space occupied by 
an obscured object without any signs of resistance. Apparently, the infants’ model includes information 
about the no longer visible object, and expectations about its effect on other objects. The internal model 
therefore holds the information (e.g. there is this object) until it is erased through forgetting or until 
incompatible information updates the model (Perner 1991). The model’s time-bridging capacity seems 
to be quite limited at first. Searching for an object hidden under one of two cloths deteriorates to chance 
level if the delay between witnessing the placement and starting the search is more than 8 s in ten-
month-olds (Diamond 1985), and more than only 20 s in 16-month-olds (Daechler et al. 1976). This 
does not mean, however, that the infant does not store information and accumulate knowledge. Indeed, 
recent research has shown that young infants learn from single events and show deferred imitation (e.g. 
Bauer 1996; Rovee-Collier 1997). 
The first two years witness an increasing sophistication in other areas of the infant’s mental and 
physical capabilities. Piaget (e.g. 1954) aptly called this phase the sensorimotor period. Perceptions form 
mental concepts-or schemas, in Piagetian terminology. New experiences are incorporated or assimilated 
into existing schemas (applying an old schema to a new stimulus) and these schemas themselves are 
altered or accommodated to new experiential demands (adapting an old schema to a new stimulus). 
Piaget (e.g. 1951, 1952, 1954) described in detail the invariant sequences of sensorimotor development 
in regard to imitation, causality, means-ends, and object concept. Exploration and play soon make the 
formation and extension of the inner mental model an active preoccupation for the infant. 
The development of the object concept, and other aspects of human sensorimotor development, are now 
being systematically studied in other primates. Indeed, a whole new research programme is devoted to 
this study. Parker (1990) called it comparative developmental evolutionary psychology. Monkeys and 
apes follow the same developmental sequence as humans, although they have fewer schemas, achieve 
the various stages at different rates, and reach different levels as their highest achievement. The general 
pattern of cognitive development appears to be an invariant sequence across the primate species (see, for 
example, Parker and Gibson 1990). Because this quasi-universal development in primates points to 
homology, it seems to be most plausible and parsimonious to assume that subjective phenomenological 
(mental) correlates of this development are homologous, also. In other words, the quality of mental 
experience in young infants and young monkeys might be very similar, and might have existed already 
in infants of our common ancestor. 
However, in the second year the human infant acquires a new capacity to go beyond a single 
updating model to form multiple models. This has far-reaching consequences, and among the primate 
species this development might be shared by the other great apes only. 
 
 
The collating mind 
 
The next transition of representational capacity sets the stage for mental detachment from the immediate 
present. The mind goes beyond the single updating model of reality to entertain other hypothetical 
models. The creation of multiple models or secondary representations allows for a whole new set of 
skills. Throughout the discussion I will adhere to Perner’s (1991) analysis of the nature of 
representations. In brief, a representation comprises a representational medium which represents some-
thing as having certain properties. For example, the medium might be a picture, the thing represented a 
house, and it might be represented as being blue (even if it’s actually red). 
A single updating model is based on primary mental representations. Its main function is to 
represent significant features of the outer world accurately. Secondary representations, on the other 
hand, are decoupled from the causal link to the real world. They can represent imaginary, past, or future 
situations. In this sense, play and curiosity might be precursors of the ability to consider multiple 
models. The collating mind can bring primary and secondary representations into propositional relation. 
That is, one can think of x (secondary representation) while looking at y (primary representation) and 
collate x and y (cf. Olson 1993). The mind can now not only feel, perceive and represent the world, but 
it can also think about things or events while feeling, perceiving, and representing the same or other 
things or events. This also enables the individual to interpret the representational content of other 
representations (e.g. of pictures, or others’ thoughts). The primary perception of the pixel configuration 
on a two-dimensional TV screen is set aside, in favour of a secondary representation of the three-
dimensional objects and events that the pictures represent. Note that these TV events are not simply 
mistaken for reality, although they might provoke emotional reactions and so forth appropriate to the 
realities they depict. 
In the following section I will discuss some of the most important new skills a mind with 
multiple models possesses. I shall present and compare developmental and comparative data for each of 
these skills. My model predicts that they should all make their debut from around the same time in 
human development (by about one and a half years), and that our closest phylogenetic relatives, the 
great apes, are in principle capable of all these skills. This would support the claim that the ability to 
form secondary representations is a domain-general skill, and that this skill evolved before the line that 
led to modern apes and humans began to split, some 12 to 15 million years ago. 
Several developmental and evolutionary theorists have recognized the significance of 
the transition to multiple models. Many names have been used, depending on the authors’ 
theoretical positions: these include synchronous identities (Bischof 1985), imagining other 
possible worlds (Byrne and Whiten 1992), metarepresentation (Leslie 1987), representation (Olson 
1993), secondary representation (Perner 1991), and symbolic function (Piaget 1951). Dennett 
(1995) coined the term Popperian Creature, after Sir Karl Popper, who once observed that the 
new skill allows hypotheses to die instead of the individual. What he meant was that multiple 
models can be used as mental testing grounds for behaviour rather than having to try out the 
real world and suffer real consequences. This, of course, is what we call insight-the search for 
new means to goals by mental operations rather than physical trial and error. 
 
Insight, planning, and object permanence 
 
Insight involves the creation of a propositional relation between the reality model (primary) and 
the hypothetical model of a desired goal state (secondary). Simple planning, too, can be 
understood as requiring the perception of the current situation (primary) and keeping a goal 
state in mind (secondary). These primary and secondary models need to be collated in order to 
conceive how one can get from the current to the desired situation. Piaget’s search tests for 
(stage 6) object permanence might also require secondary representation (Perner 1991), but here 
the secondary model represents a past, rather than a future, state of the world. A classic 
procedure is as follows: The child watches a desired object being put into a box. The box is 
then placed under a rug where the object is covertly hidden. Finally the empty box is revealed 
to the child. With a single updating model of the world the individual only has access to the 
current situation. An infant does not know where the object might be. With multiple models, 
the individual can consider, not only the primary representation (box is empty), but also a 
secondary representation (past-object inside box under the rug) to create a good guess as to 
where the object is (under the rug). 
By one and a half years most children pass these hidden-displacement tests (Haake and 
Somerville 1985) and show signs of insight (Piaget 1952). Planning, too, becomes evident in 
that the children begin to show signs of monitoring, correcting, and controlling goal-directed 
actions, and showing positive affective responses to mastery (Kagan 1981; Bullock and 
Luetkenhaus 1988). The emotional pleasure appears to be the result of achievement; the primary 
representation of the present reality now matches the preconceived secondary representation of 
the goal state. 
Great apes have been observed solving problems in a way that strongly suggests insight. 
Kohler’s (1917/1927) classic experiments illustrate this. Faced with the problem of bananas 
hanging out of reach from the roof, the chimpanzee apparently contemplated the situation and 
suddenly enacted a solution (e.g. stacking boxes upon each other) without hesitation. The 
chimpanzee seemed to mentally manipulate components of the situation in its imagination until 
hitting upon a solution to the problem. In contrast with great apes, monkeys and other animals 
have not yet provided convincing evidence of insightful behaviour (cf. Visalberghi and 
Limongelli 1994). 
The same applies to planning where, again in contrast with monkeys, great apes have 
shown considerable skill. Dohl (1970), for example, showed that the chimpanzee Julia was able 
to look up to five steps ahead in a sequential-planning task. The chimpanzee was confronted 
with a series of two keys in transparent boxes. She had to choose the right key at the first trial 
to get to the right key at the second, the right key at the second to get the right key at the third, 
and so on, in order to finally reach the food reward. Only by working mentally backwards from 
the goal could the initial right key be determined. In other words, in addition to the primary 
representation of the situation, Julia considered the goal state (secondary representation) and 
worked out the steps towards the goal state before acting (see Suddendorf and Corballis 1997 
for further examples). 
While the first stages in the developmental sequence towards object permanence are 
commonly passed by many species, hidden displacement has been proven in few, including the 
great apes (Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1983; Natale and Antinucci 1989; Miles 1990). There is also 
evidence that African grey parrots can pass such tests (Pepperberg and Kozak 1986), but it is 
debatable as to whether secondary representations are implied by the particular tests used in 
this work (Natale and Antinucci 1989). Although monkeys can extrapolate hidden movement 
(Filion et al. 1996), they fail object permanence tasks (deBlois and Novak 1994). Natale et al. 
(1986) showed by employing `catch’ trials that a macaque used simple search rules in hidden 
displacement tasks, in contrast to a gorilla who, like a one-and-a-half-year-old human, showed 
systematic search implying secondary representation of the past path of the object. 
Great apes and children from about one and a half years therefore appear to possess 
secondary representational skill as evidenced through planning, insight, and object permanence. 
 
The beginning of symbolism – pretence, pictures, and language 
 
Pretending that one object is another entails secondary representation because the object of 
perception (primary representation) is treated as if it were a different object (secondary 
representation). This requires decoupling from the primary representation (Leslie 1987). 
Further, in representing what someone else is pretending, one is interpreting their actions in 
terms of secondary representation; Leslie refers to this as metarepresentation, but in this 
chapter I reserve that term for the ability to represent representations as representations (cf. 
Pylyshyn 1978; Perner 1991; Astington 1994). As already noted, metarepresentation in this 
original sense does not emerge until about the fourth year of life-even in the realm of pretend 
play (Lillard 1993; Jarrold et al. 1994; Suddendorf et al., in press). But already in earlier 
pretence, the child has to create secondary representations (the as if situation) in addition to the 
primary representation (real situation). This behaviour begins by about one and a half years 
(e.g., Leslie 1987). 
There is some controversial evidence suggesting that great apes can pretend. Sign-
trained chimpanzees, orang-utans, and gorillas have been reported to engage in pretend play 
with dolls (Gardner and Gardner 1969; Patterson and Linden 1981; Miles 1990). Patterson and 
Linden claim, for instance, that the gorilla Koko frequently pretends that one of her plastic 
alligators has `real’ properties, and uses it to `frighten’ her human caregivers (Patterson and 
Linden 1981). There are also some anecdotes of imaginary toy play (e.g. Hayes 1951; Savage-
Rumbaugh and McDonald 1988). Although these examples all involve zoo or home-reared animals, 
they are still evidence that apes can engage in such behaviours. Other species do not seem to pretend. 
A cat’s prey-catching behaviour with a ball probably does not constitute pretence, because it is 
stimulus-elicited and inflexible (Whiten and Byrne 1991). 
Pictures usually represent something, for example the characters and events in a story. 
Understanding what they represent, therefore, involves representing representational content. While 
infants in their first year treat pictures as just a piece of colourful paper, during the second year 
pictures develop a magical attraction. The child can now interpret pictures in the sense of forming a 
mental model of the depicted situation (Perner 1991). This requires multiple models, because the true 
current situation (e.g. mum holding the family photo album) and the one pictured (e.g., mum at a 
beach holiday) have to be differentiated. A mental model of a depicted situation (photo, drawing, or 
TV), like a model of a pretended situation, is a secondary representation. Great apes interpret pictorial 
information appropriately and show interest in videos and picture books (e.g. Premack and Woodruff 
1978; Patterson 1991). 
The interpretation of symbols such as words or signs also begins during the second year. This 
also might be based on the emerging ability to entertain secondary representations in addition to the 
primary representation of the sound or the sight. Attempts at teaching signs to animals have resulted 
in moderate successes in a few species. Chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orang-utans have been 
successfully taught production and comprehension of words (signs), often numbering in the hundreds 
(Gardner and Gardner 1969; Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh 1990; Miles 1990; Patterson 1991). 
Limited success has also been reported in dolphins (e.g. Herman et al. 1993), sea lions (e.g. 
Schusterman et al. 1993), and African grey parrots (e.g. Pepperberg 1990, 1993). The most 
linguistically competent animal so far appears to be the bonobo Kanzi, whose capacity for language 
has been assessed as approximating that of a two-year-old human (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993). 
Other aspects of early symbolic understanding such as classification and negation (cf. Olson 1993) or 
the ability to deduce word reference from the speaker’s focus of attention (cf. Baldwin 1993) might 
also be facilitated through secondary representational skills and great apes might be quite capable in 
these respects. 
 
Self awareness: mirror self-recognition 
 
Reflections are similar to pictures, and the development of an understanding of reflective surfaces 
might parallel that of understanding pictures. Reflective surfaces can be used to discover what one 
looks like. Researchers have developed a formal test to assess mirror self-recognition (e.g. 
Amsterdam 1972; Gallup 1970). Individuals pass the test by retrieving a mark, such as a sticker or 
rouge covertly placed by the experimenter, from their faces while viewing their mirror image. This 
test has become a standard tool for the non-verbal measurement of an early cognitive understanding 
of self. 
An understanding of the properties of a mirror is implied by the realization of the identity 
between directly and indirectly (mirrored) perceived objects (object match) and between directly and 
indirectly observed actions (event match or contingency testing). Self-recognition is a special case of 
object and event matching. Parts of the visible body (e.g. hands) match their mirrored counterparts, and 
proprioceptive and visual information about action also correspond with their mirrored equivalents. 
Such identification, or what Bischof (1985) called synchronous identity, seems to require secondary 
representation because one event or object has to be held in mind (secondary representation) while the 
perceptual system engages with the other (primary representation), in order that the relation between the 
two can be recognized. 
The mirror mark test provides stronger evidence for the presence of secondary representations 
than the mere use of mirrored information, because the latter can be based on associative learning. For 
mirror self-recognition the individual has to hold in mind a picture of what the reflection `ought’ to look 
like, based on past experience (secondary), in order to realize that the mirror image it currently perceives 
(primary) is different. The reflection might, for example, show an unexpected red dot on the forehead. 
Only if this discrepancy is noted does it make sense for the individual to investigate its own forehead in 
search of the dot. Thus, passing the test is evidence for secondary representation and the existence of 
some kind of mental image of self (as seen from the outside). In human development the mark test is 
passed at about one and a half years and co-emerges with self-recognition in photos (Amsterdam 1972; 
M. Lewis and Brooks-Gunn 1979). Some argue that it marks the onset of autobiographic memory 
(Howe and Courage 1993, 1997), but I argue against this in the metamind section below. 
Over the last twenty years the mirror self-recognition test has been used to study a wide variety 
of animals ranging from birds to dolphins (Parker et al. 1994). Macaques (Anderson 1986), elephants 
(Povinelli 1989), and parrots (Pepperberg et al. 1995) have all been shown to use mirrors appropriately, 
but only great apes have been shown to pass the classic mark test. This includes at least some 
chimpanzees, bonobos, orang-utans, and gorillas (Gallup 1970; Suarez and Gallup 1981; Patterson 
1991; Hyatt and Hopkins 1994). Event-matching is clearly present in these species. Menzel et al. (1985) 
produced additional evidence that chimpanzees, but not macaques, could relate indirect perception and 
proprioception, because they could use a video image to guide their hand movements. Interestingly, 
dolphins, while not testable in the classic way, might also engage in contingency testing (Marten and 
Psarakos 1994, 1995). 
 
Other-awareness – synchronic imitation, empathic behaviour, and mental attribution 
 
To be aware of the perspective of others, or other-awareness, might entail secondary representations. 
Another individual’s perspective is not part of the perceptual field but is an inference, a propositional 
relationship between a secondary representation and a primary representation. Other-awareness and self-
awareness emerge together, presumably because they both depend on the ability to form secondary 
representation (cf. Asendorpf et al. 1996). 
During the second year other-awareness in children becomes evident in various ways, including 
self-consciousness while the centre of another’s attention (M. Lewis et al. 1989), cooperation with peers 
(Brownell and Carriger 1990), prosocial behaviour towards victims of distress (Zahn-Waxler et al. 
1979), and communication through synchronic imitation (Asendorpf and Baudonniere 1993). The last 
two have been found to be strongly associated with self-recognition (Bischof-Kohler 1989; Asendorpf 
and Baudonniere 1993; Asendorpf et al. 1996). At the same age, children also begin to attribute mental 
states to others (e.g. Dunn 1991). For example, they might re-enact what an adult (but not an inanimate 
object) seemed to intend to do rather than what the adult actually did (Meltzoff 1995). Early mental 
attribution is about desires and intentions (Wellman 1990). Because mental states are not observable, 
they cannot be derived from direct perception. Rather, they result from cognitive processes relating 
conception (secondary) and perception (primary) in the observing individual. Secondary representations 
are therefore critically important for the attribution of intentionality. 
Of course, most animal species must have some awareness of the presence of others. But 
evidence for other-awareness based on secondary representation is again strongest for the great apes. An 
example in chimpanzees was reported by de Waal (1982)-a subordinate male who displayed sexual 
interest to a female immediately covered his erect penis with his hand when he noticed that a dominant 
male was approaching. Macaques, on the other hand, failed to show an understanding of another’s 
perspective even after training (e.g. Kummer et al. 1996). A collection of anecdotes of primate tactical 
deception (Whiten and Byrne 1988; Byrne and Whiten 1990, 1992) contain many examples of self-
conscious behaviour shown by great apes when they were the centre of others’ attention.1 The record for 
lesser apes and monkeys is much scantier and more controversial. 
In deception, other-awareness is used to take advantage of another individual. It might also be 
used for mutual advantage. Cooperation is of course common throughout the animal (and even the 
plant) kingdom. In most cases, however, it takes the form of long-term symbiotic behaviour. It is short-
term cooperation in innovative problem solving that is more likely to involve some kind of perspective 
taking. There are many records of such cooperative innovation in chimpanzees (e.g. Kohler 1917/1927; 
Menzel 1974; de Waal 1989), but without a clear behavioural definition of when cooperation entails 
taking the perspective of the other, such anecdotes cannot be cited with confidence as evidence of 
secondary representation skills. Experimental work by Povinelli and colleagues (Povinelli et al. 1992a, 
b) showed that chimpanzees, but not rhesus monkeys, were capable of role reversal in a cooperative 
task, and the authors argued that only the chimpanzees showed `empathy’, that is, understood their 
partner’s role – although Heyes (1993) has provided an alternative account of these data, based 
on associative learning. 
There are very few records of spontaneous empathic behaviour in animals. There are the 
classic tales of dolphins helping humans in distress. Some credible accounts relating to great 
                                                 
1
 At face value, the anecdotes of tactical deception in great apes appear to suggest 
metarepresentational capacities (cf. Whiten and Byrne 1991). I argue, however, that the difference 
between monkey and ape deception can be explained on the basis of the difference between a primary 
and a collating mind. Since writing this chapter my attention has been drawn to a paper by Whiten 
(1996) in which he re-evaluates the deception data. Independently, considering imitation, pretence 
and mindreading, he comes to the same conclusion that great apes can entertain secondary 
representations, but not metarepresentations. 
 
apes have been published. Washoe, the Gardner’s home-reared chimpanzee, saved a young 
chimp, who had fallen into a moat, from drowning (Fouts and Fouts 1993). Boesch (1992) has 
reported evidence for chimpanzee compassion and empathy from the field. Most recently a 
gorilla saved a three-year-old boy, who fell 15 feet into the gorilla enclosure at Chicago’s 
Brookfield Zoo, by carrying him to a door and alerting zoo-keepers. Although controversy still 
surrounds the issue, O’Connell (1995) reviewed the evidence and concluded that chimpanzees 
do have empathy. 
Opinions about imitation in animals have changed dramatically in the last decades. 
Behaviours that were formerly considered as clear examples of imitation have recently been 
explained in terms of social learning processes such as stimulus enhancement and social 
facilitation (Meador et al. 1987). The most frequently cited case is the learning of song by birds, 
but this behaviour seems to be based on an innate program enabling direct comparison of the 
individual’s own sound production with the memory trace (`tape recording’) of the model 
sound (e.g. Lorenz 1973; Byrne 1994). Imitation of visually perceived behaviour might be 
significantly more difficult, because motor tasks might look very different from different 
perspectives. Indeed, it might be necessary to take the perspective of the model if one is to 
compare one’s own behaviour with that of the model, particularly if imitation is to occur syn-
chronously with the model behaviour. Contrary to common belief, there is no convincing 
evidence for imitation in monkeys (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Whiten and Ham 1992). The 
evidence for `aping’ in great apes is also scant, but more convincing (Goodall 1986; Meador et 
al. 1987; Byrne 1994). Dolphins also seem to be capable of imitation (Herman et al. 1993). 
Great apes have also provided evidence for mental attribution of intention and desire. 
Indeed, the whole enterprise of studying the development of `theory of mind’ stemmed from a 
seminal article presenting evidence for the attribution of intention in a chimpanzee (Premack 
and Woodruff 1978). The conclusions remain controversial (cf. Heyes, 1998, and 
commentaries), but experimental (e.g. Povinelli et al. 1998a) and observational (e.g. Whiten and 
Byrne 1988) data suggest at least limited understanding of mind in great apes-perhaps 
comparable with that of a two-year-old child. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
In accordance with my model, comparative and developmental data seem to converge across 
skills. Great apes show evidence for a collating mind through their apparent knowledge about 
self and others, and skills such as pretence, planning, insight, sign-language learning, and 
mental attribution. In human development the child begins to display these capacities during 
the second year. Thus, it was argued that children of this age and great apes have collating 
minds. 
To many developmental and comparative psychologists, this kind of generalization is a 
challenge. They are eager to show that much younger children can pass this or that test, if it is 
appropriately simplified, or that some bird or insect can solve the problem, if the test uses 
species-relevant stimuli. Despite this tendency, and the accumulation of some evidence for 
gradual improvement, I maintain that these changes, in the second year of human life, and 
between the monkey and ape lines of descent, can best be described as a qualitative shift in 
representational capacity. The capacity for secondary representation shows itself in a range of 
domains, but these domains themselves might have their roots in earlier developments. Thus, 
precursors of the later skills might suggest more gradual development. 
The proposal does not, of course, exclude the possibility that some other lines of 
descent have also evolved collating minds, and strong arguments might be made for secondary 
representation in large-brained birds, such as parrots, and in aquatic mammals, especially 
dolphins. Any ape-like abilities in these species, however, must be the result of convergent 
evolution. But among the primates, the fact that all our closest sister species, the great apes, 
show evidence for a secondary representation in all of the respects discussed above is strong 
support for Darwinian evolution of mind. Evolutionary parsimony suggests that our common 
ancestors had already evolved the basis of a collating mind some 15 million years ago. 
 
Metamind 
 
During the fourth year children seem to change quite dramatically in the way they see the 
world, others, and themselves. Parents observe that their children begin to make their own 
plans, have their own long-term goals (such as what they will do when they grow up), recall 
what one told them last week (especially when it contradicts today’s explanation), consider 
other people’s minds, deceive and lie, restrain themselves, start to read and to follow complex 
story lines, invent their own stories (generating entirely novel scenarios), their own symbols, 
and perhaps an imaginary friend, draw moral conclusions, and actively ask why and what for in 
their attempts to make sense of the world. While these pre-schoolers are clearly just children, 
prone to all sorts of mistakes and silliness, we adults notice, often with pride, their first 
precocious attempts at reason and reflection. A fascinating new realm has opened up to the 
child. Almost out of the blue, the young person’s mind is completely and without a doubt far 
beyond the reaches of any animal’s mind. What happened? 
I propose that the child has developed a metamirzd. A key aspect of metamind is the 
ability to metarepresent. Metarepresentations, according to Pylyshyn (1978), are representations 
of representational relations. Representations themselves can now be represented as 
representations (Perner 1991). This has far-reaching implications. Perner emphasized that to 
understand (i.e. metarepresent) something (e.g. a picture) as a representation one has to master 
the distinction between what something represents (e.g. my house) and how it represents it as 
being (e.g. the house is blue in the picture although it has since been painted red). 
Through making this distinction one can form higher-order predicates such as `is true’ 
or `is false’ about the representation (cf. Olson 1993). Many different representations (e.g. an 
old picture, my memory, your memory, or an `artist’s impression’ from a real-estate 
advertisement) might refer to the same object or event (e.g. my house) and represent it in very 
different ways (e.g. as new, beautiful, and blue, while it is truly old, shabby, and red). With 
metarepresentation, then, representational relations can be tagged with predicates (e.g. your 
view; my memory), and the individual can now simultaneously entertain several distinct 
representations of the same object or event in reality without running into paradoxical conflicts. 
It is not clear, however, whether the relationship is not the other way round. It might be that the 
ability to entertain various conflicting representations simultaneously is what enables the 
individual to create representations of representational relations (i.e. metarepresentations). 
Here, I will treat both abilities as the two sides of the same coin. With metamind the child can 
appreciate representations as representations and can entertain various conflicting 
representations of the same object or event. It follows that the child can now understand that 
people’s minds, as well as pictures, words, and other representational systems, might represent 
the same world in different (e.g., true, false, exaggerated, imprecise, outdated, wishful ... ) 
ways. 
This is also important for reflections on one’s own mind. One can be wrong. Things are 
not always what they seem. A distinction between appearance and reality requires one to 
represent the same object or event in two conflicting ways simultaneously (e.g. what it looks 
like and what it really is). With a metamind, children can grasp that their own primary 
representations might be false or distorted, whereas to the collating mind the primary 
representation defines reality, even though the secondary representation might deviate from it. 
Metamind enables the individual to entertain various ways of looking at the same thing-
representing what it is, looks like, was, could be, should be, and so on. Consideration of these 
various perspectives allows for a greater, and more informed, choice of behavioural options. On 
a social level, they help the individual to understand that other views are taken as the truth by 
other representers. The child can now understand that people will search for a desired object 
where they think it is, not necessarily where the child knows it is. And, as will become evident 
in later discussion, these examples only scratch the surface of the vast number of skills that are 
dependent on the representational advance to metamind. 
The term metamind comprises all those kinds of thought and reasoning that are based on 
metarepresentational understanding. At times, metamind can be somewhat disengaged from 
immediate primary representations. It can `wander off’, as it were, and entertain a variety of 
propositions. It is the stage for complex reasoning, considering `what if?’, theorizing, 
reconstructing the past, and planning the future. Metamind enables the cognitive apparatus to 
function off-line (cf. Bickerton 1995). I am referring to that part of our mind that is dreaming or 
reasoning while the on-line processes are, say, driving the car. We can be so far removed from 
the on-line processes that we sometimes wonder how we drove to where we are now, with no 
recollection of the journey. 
The second key aspect of metamind is an increase in executive control. It is important 
to note that metamind is only adaptive because the results of this disengaged thinking can be 
related to current perceptions. The conclusions drawn from these mental exercises can 
positively affect survival and procreation. Instead of acting simply on the basis of the current 
situation (i.e., what seems to be true-according to primary representation), the individual can 
now cognitively base behavioural decisions on what was, what could be, what should be, and what 
might be true, as well as on what seems to be true for others. In order to benefit from these 
considerations the individual has to be able to (at times) suspend ‘lower-level’ impulsive response 
patterns. 
Metamind requires an ability to disengage or dissociate from the immediate response to 
perception. Mental computation increasingly demands priority in determining behaviour. Thus, 
executive control is crucially important to any adaptive advantage of the metamind. Of course, even we 
adults are not entirely rational and are often guided by immediate impulse rather than reason. Metamind 
emerges as a new addition to a cognitive apparatus that is already sophisticated. Instincts or ,gut-
feelings’ might sometimes be better than our best reasoning processes at assessing what is good or bad 
for us. However, large parts of our lives and our culture are based on our capacity to override immediate 
behavioural predispositions and base our decision on our reflective metamind. 
In sum, metamind comprises advances in representational and executive abilities. 
Metarepresentation enables the individual to form higher-order predicates such as `is true’ and `is false’ 
or `your belief and `my belief. Various conflicting representations of the same object or event can now 
be entertained concurrently. These representations can be brought into complex relations, and reasoning 
with and about things well beyond the immediately present becomes possible. For this ability to unfold 
fully, the individual must learn to disengage from the preoccupation with immediate perceptions. 
Metamind enables a more accurate and present-transcending modelling of reality. If it is to be of any 
adaptive advantage, metamind must be able to override impulsive response patterns and replace them 
with responses based on reflective reasoning. In other words, the mind increasingly exerts executive 
control. 
While there is ample evidence that our closest relatives, the great apes, have also evolved a 
collating mind, there is a marked lack of evidence that they possess the key elements of metamind. 
Although they have the rudiments of many human capacities, it seems that they lack precisely those 
aspects that catapult these capacities to new heights, beginning in humans at about age four. However, it 
is of course impossible to prove that a species is not capable of X or Y. After all, it takes only one 
individual at any one point in time to disprove the claim. Nevertheless, in the light of current evidence it 
is most parsimonious to assume that none of the great ape species, or any other animal for that matter, 
has developed a metamind (cf. Heyes 1993, 1998). Indeed, naturalistic observations confirm that 
despite the great apes’ remarkable skills, they did not invent morality, history, music, justice, art, 
religion, language, or any other human cultural universal that, as will be seen, implies metamind. 
The achievements of the growing cognitive apparatus between ages three and four have been 
studied intensely over the last decade, but authors have emphasized different aspects. Some have 
referred to the `inner eye’ (Humphrey 1986), others talk of `theory of mind’ (Premack and Woodruff 
1978; Wimmer and Perner 1983), `mental time-travel’ (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997), ‘second-
order intentionality’ (Dennett 1978), or `executive function’ (Russell et al. 1994; Zelazo et al. 1996). 
The achievements in all these domains, I suggest, are based on metarepresentation and increased 
executive control. That is, the concept of `metamind’ embraces the reflective self-reference of `inner 
eye’ (an introspection organ), the social and abstract component of `theory of mind’ (a mind-reading 
organ), the temporally extended sense of reality implied in `mental time-travel’ (autobiographic 
memory and remote future plans), the active association of ‘second-order intentionality’ (action 
plans and strategies), as well as the regulatory aspect of `executive function’ (the mental 
government of behaviour). I shall provide logical and empirical grounds for bringing together 
all these changes that occur at the transition between three and four years of age under the 
single heading metamind. 
It is the theory-of-mind aspect that has received most attention over the last decade. 
`Theory of mind’ refers to the explanation and prediction of behaviour based on the attribution 
of mental states such as intention, knowledge, or belief. There is a fast-paced on-going debate 
about such questions as whether the underlying mechanisms are innate or socially constructed 
(e.g. Carruthers and Smith 1996), whether imitation or pretence is the precursor (e.g. Moore 
1996), or whether theory of mind develops through simulation or through theory construction, 
but the debates are really about the relative importance of these factors (Astington 1994). In 
respect of whether theory of mind is based on simulation or on theory construction, for 
example, it is clear that adults can use both strategies-they can reason abstractly about, say, the 
probable mental state of someone they have betrayed, but they can also gain further insight into 
what the other might feel by mentally putting themselves into his or her position. Thus, instead 
of entering these debates (see Carruthers and Smith 1996), I want to look at the overall 
interconnected change that occurs at age four. It is now time to put empirical `flesh’ to the 
theoretical bone structure I have presented so far. 
 
‘Theory-of-mind’ tests of metamind 
 
Ever since Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) pioneering research on mental attribution, 
understanding false beliefs has been the crucial test for metarepresentation and `theory of 
mind’. People act according to how they represent the world, rather than according to how the 
world actually is. In the case of true beliefs, representation and reality are identical, but in the 
case of false beliefs they differ. Only the attribution of false beliefs can therefore unequivocally 
reveal an understanding of the representational nature of mind (Dennett 1978; Wimmer and 
Perner 1983). False-belief attribution also implies the other metamind skills, namely, the ability 
to dissociate or disengage from the immediate perception (e.g. regardless of where a desired 
object truly is, the person will look where she thinks it is) and to simultaneously entertain two 
conflicting representations of the same object or event (e.g. I know the object is here but she 
thinks the object is there). 
At about the same age that children become able to ascribe false beliefs to others (by 
about three and a half to four years) they become able to attribute false beliefs to themselves. 
Gopnik and Astington (1988) showed that younger children fail on tests of representational 
change-when their belief was changed, they reported having held the current belief all along. 
When asked what they thought was inside a candy box before they were shown that there were 
pencils (not candy) inside, they stated that they originally thought there were pencils inside. 
Again, in order to entertain the past false belief (that there was candy in the box), the child has 
to be able to metarepresent the beliefs as true and false (or current and past) and disengage from the 
current knowledge about the true state of affairs. 
Flavell and colleagues (e.g. Flavell et al. 1986) showed that children begin to distinguish 
between appearance and reality at around the same time. Younger children have problems 
understanding the difference. Pouring milk into a blue glass does not change the milk’s colour but only 
our perception of it. To differentiate between the two, the child has to establish a relationship between 
the propositional relation held in mind and the perceived situation (Olson 1993). The two representa-
tions (e.g. `is blue’ and `is white’) have to be metarepresented or tagged as `looks like’ and `is truly’ and 
the child has to disengage from the current perception (blue) to answer the question about the reality 
(white). 
One might be concerned about whether young children simply fail these tasks because they do 
not know what the researchers mean or want (e.g. Siegal 1995). Flavell et al. (1987) showed in 
various ingenious ways that children’s conceptual problems are genuine. For example, a white card was 
held under a blue filter and the experimenter detached a pre-cut piece from the card and presented the 
child with this white piece and a corresponding blue piece. Asked which piece was taken from the card 
three-year-olds tended to point to the blue piece, thereby failing to recognize the distinction between 
appearance and reality. Passing false-belief, representational change, and appearance-reality tasks have 
been found to be correlated (Gopnik and Astington 1988; Moore et al. 1990), substantiating the notion 
of a common underlying representational mechanism (e.g. Flavell 1993). 
Another aspect of how the representational mind works is the basic relationship between 
informational access (i.e. perception) and knowledge. Children younger than three and a half do not 
fully comprehend that, for example, seeing leads to knowing (Wimmer et al. 1988; Perrier and 
Ruffinan 1995; but see Pratt and Bryant 1990). Again, children need to metarepresent the other’s 
perception (or ensuing representation) and to disengage from their own perception in order to reason 
about what is and what is not available to the other’s mind. Further, this seems to be true also for the 
reconstruction of how information entered one’s own system. Asked how they know what they know 
(e.g. being told, having seen, or having inferred the location of an object) three-year-olds fail to respond 
above chance (Gopnik and Graf 1988; O’Neill and Gopnik 1991; Woolley and Bruell 1996). Indeed, 
even four-year-olds tend to claim that they have always known what in fact they have just learned today 
(Taylor et al. 1994). Source memory also requires that the current mental state is set aside and a 
different past state is entertained. 
Like conflicting knowledge and belief, conflicting desires seem to be understood only by about 
age four (Moore et al. 1995). Younger children ascribe desires and intentions to others. But, when 
children younger than five hold a strong desire they seem unable to recognize that another person might 
desire something different. Their own desire might be too overwhelming to dissociate from. If there is 
no strong desire on the part of the ascriber, the attribution does not pose a problem. Older children, 
through metarepresentation, can tag the desires as `mine’ and `yours’ and the conflict is resolved since 
both desires can be simultaneously entertained. 
Once again, a task that is similar except that it involves the self rather than others produces 
comparable results. Zelazo and colleagues (e.g. Frye et al. 1995; Zelazo et al. 1996) found that 
changing the rules in a card-sorting task poses a problem for three but not for five-year-olds. For 
example, children had to sort cards first according to shape and then according to colour. The younger 
children continued to sort according to the first rule. They needed to disengage from the first rule (or 
desire to order by shape) in order to sort according to the second rule. Understanding embedded rules 
(i.e. use rule 1 in game A and rule 2 in game B) might also require representing representational 
relations (cf. Zelazo and Jacques 1997). The younger children showed evidence of understanding both 
rules, but they could not use this knowledge to guide their action. Similarly, there is evidence that 
even three-year-olds can remember their earlier false beliefs (Freeman et al. 1995 used cued recall to 
elicit such memory), yet without support this knowledge is not accessible for action control. 
Some recent research suggests that in particular circumstances children’s performance on 
theory-of-mind tasks can be enhanced (e.g. Chandler and Hala 1994; Saltmarsh et al. 1995). Mitchell 
(1997) argues that younger children’s problems with theory-of-mind tasks are due to of an attentional 
magnetism to a tangible reality. Thus, theory-of-mind tasks that involve the child and provide tangible 
objects corresponding to, say, false beliefs, can be passed even by three-year-olds. In effect, these 
easier theory-of-mind tasks impose less of a demand on the child’s ability to disengage. Recent 
research by Clements and Perner (1997) suggests that children might have some implicit 
understanding of false beliefs before developing it explicitly. In any case, the point of the research 
was not to show that three-year-olds lack a theory of mind; rather, it was to find a way of showing 
that a child might have a representational theory of mind (Dennett 1978). When children reliably pass 
false-belief tasks we know that they understand that people act according to their representations of 
the world. 
Evidence from animals has proven elusive, because few theory-of-mind tests have been 
successfully adapted for comparative research. Povinelli et al. (1990) argued that chimpanzees 
recognized the distinction between a `guesser’ and a `knower’, and this result seemed to have 
promising implications for chimpanzees’ capacity to recognize the relationship between perception 
and knowledge. Further studies, however, proved that the design did not yield evidence for mental 
attribution performance even in humans (Gagliardi et al. 1995), and that young chimpanzees are 
ignorant of the fact that seeing leads to knowing (Povinelli and Eddy 1996). Premack (1988) provided 
the only attempt to test false-belief attribution in a chimpanzee, and the single subject in that study 
failed to provide evidence. Premack concluded that chimpanzees do not have a fully-fledged theory of 
mind (Premack and Dasser 1991; see also Heyes 1998). What they appear to lack is a metamind. 
 
Metamind and social knowledge 
 
Being able to understand that others have minds is, of course, of tremendous value for all kinds of 
social interaction. By age four, children have developed an impressive basic understanding of the 
workings of mind. Contrary to the impression gained from the literature, the particular theories of 
how mind and world interact vary profoundly between cultures. Lillard (1998) identifies four basic 
types of variation between different folk psychologies: “magic, unmandated conceptual distinctions, 
denial of the negative, and varying values” (p. 23). Vast differences can also be observed within 
western culture. Some groups, for example, believe in mental powers such as telekinesis or 
telepathy. Others believe in spirits and in `god’ having access to one’s private thoughts. 
Children acquire their `theory of mind’ within these socio-cultural contexts. While there is 
great variation between these theories, the basic capacity for generating such concepts about 
the mental (i.e., having a metamind), I argue, is a human cultural universal. 
In general, others’ beliefs, intentions, and knowledge are great predictors of their 
behaviour, and cooperation as well as deception become far more effective if one knows what 
is on the other’s mind. Indeed, changing others’ behaviour is usually most effective when one 
changes their minds. Research (mainly in western cultures) has shown that when children pass 
theory-of-mind tasks, they improve in their social understanding. Lalonde and Chandler (1995), 
for example, found that teachers rated children who pass false-belief tasks to be higher in 
social-emotional maturity than those who fail. The new level of social understanding also 
shows in particular areas such as deception (Peskin 1992; Ruffinan et al. 1993). With metamind 
children begin to appreciate the subtler and more sophisticated aspects of the social world. The 
vast majority of our stories, histories, and fairy tales, for example, revolve around mental states 
like intentions, knowledge, false beliefs, surprise, betrayal, selflessness, goals, deceits, and 
morals. Only with metamind can such narratives be truly understood and the lessons inherent in 
the stories be learned (cf. Peskin 1996). Indeed, cultural learning in the sense of instructed 
learning, verbal self-regulation, and collaboration depends on metamind skills (cf. Tomasello et 
al. 1993). It is not surprising then that many researchers emphasize the social effect of 
metamind skills (e.g. Wimmer and Perner 1983; Dunn 1991; Byrne and Whiten 1992; Astington 
and Jenkins 1995; Baron-Cohen 1995). For a thorough discussion of the development of social 
understanding, see Barresi and Moore (1996). 
The hypothesis of Machiavellian intelligence, which postulates that human intelligence 
was born out of increasing social intelligence in primates (Jolly 1966; Humphrey 1976; Byrne 
and Whiten 1988, 1992), fits in nicely with these effects. However, even if its origin was social, 
metamind must have had significant non-social side effects. These have been largely 
overlooked. To balance the score I want to emphasis these non-social effects here. 
 
Metamind and self knowledge 
 
Understanding other minds is bound to go hand in hand with understanding one’s own mind. If 
one assumes that other minds are understood through simulation or putting oneself into the 
other’s shoes (e.g. Harris 1991), then understanding one’s own mind must come first. 
Self-awareness can be viewed from a functional or structural perspective (Gibson 1995). The 
origin of self might lie in functional developments (e.g. experience of agency). Perceived 
control is of paramount importance, and primates prefer tasks in which they experience control 
over tasks where rewards are received independently of own action, even if the actual reward is 
greater in the latter tasks (e.g. Rumbaugh et al. 1994). Interactions with the environment, 
especially the experience of agency, give rise to knowledge about the agent (the self), its 
features, and competencies. This amounts to what from a structural perspective is `the’ concept 
of self. This idea of self, me, I, or soul, is universally generated (cf. Brown 1991). I am not 
arguing that there is such a core entity, far from it, but it is important to explain why, how, and 
when children form the idea we might structurally call a personal identity. In the following I 
will present several ways in which metamind functionally influences aspects of self which add 
to the new structural conceptualization of self. 
As we have seen already, the attribution of mental states to self appears to co-emerge 
with the attribution of mental states to others (Gopnik and Astington 1988). By age four 
children begin to know that and what they know, believe, want, etc. With this reflective thought 
we have the transparency necessary for Descartes’ cogito. The child can now reflect on her own 
mental states and can potentially come to the conclusion: I think therefore I am. But who or 
what is the structure of this I? 
The ultimate question of where we come from, what we are, and where we are going 
(Humphrey 1986) can now, at least in principle, be addressed by the child. I have argued 
elsewhere (Suddendorf 1994; Suddendorf and Corballis 1997) that episodic memory is an active 
reconstructive process that depends on metamind skills. To travel mentally into one’s past and 
inspect one’s history requires mental disengagement from the present, tagging of tense (i.e. 
`pastness’) to the representation, and active metarepresentational reconstruction of episodes. 
Past mental states need to be appreciated and the source of current knowledge needs 
consideration in this process. Perner and Ruffman (1995) found evidence for an association 
between free recall and understanding the relationship between knowing and perceiving. 
Following Tulving (1985), they reasoned that episodic memory is based on autocueing through 
episodic traces which is reflected in free recall but not cued recognition. They found a robust 
correlation between free recall and perception-knowing tasks that was independent of variations 
in age and verbal intelligence. This substantiates the notion that episodic memory emerges with 
metamind (cf. Suddendorf and Corballis 1997). Recent neuropsychological work links this with 
the prefrontal cortex (Wheeler et al. 1997). 
This new function, episodic memory, has an impact on self conceptualization in that it 
is the origin of autobiographical memory: `that episode is what happened to me’ (but see Howe 
and Courage 1997). Personal identity depends on a personal history. The development of 
autobiographical memory is often described as a social interactive process (e.g. Nelson 1992) 
suggesting gradual improvements. Without denying that social effects are important (Welch-
Ross 1995), the metamind model predicts a sharper transition. Events that occurred before 
metamind are not part of autobiography, whereas events after this transition can be. As there is 
an age-correlate, the model predicts that four but not three year-olds would create an episodic 
memory of a salient event that is retrievable years later. Pillemer et al. (1994) recently provided 
empirical support for this assertion. Two groups of pre-schoolers (mean age three and a half 
and four and a half) were interviewed two weeks after a school evacuation in response to a fire. 
All children had some memory of the event. Seven years later, only children of the older group 
produced an accurate narrative memory of the event. Only 18 percent of the younger children 
were able to produce even a fragmentary memory while 57 percent of the older children did. 
With the rise of metamind around age four, childhood amnesia ceases and one’s personal 
history (i.e. autobiographical memory) begins (Suddendorf 1994; Perner and Ruffman 1995; 
Suddendorf and Corballis 1997). 
But the platform of metamind is not only used to reflect on what is and what was, but 
also on what will or could be. That is, the same mechanism is used to extrapolate from the past 
so as to conjure up scenarios of the future (Suddendorf 1994; Suddendorf and Corballis 1997).2 
Indeed, the mechanism’s selective advantage must lie in its benefits for future survival, not in 
reminiscence per se. Secondary representation makes limited planning possible, but the 
individual is tied to the present, as primary representations alone represent reality. This might 
be especially limiting with respect to one’s own drives and needs. Without anticipation of 
future needs and drives there is no point in imagining a future more remote than the satisfaction 
of current needs. With such anticipations, on the other hand, it seems imperative to secure not 
only the fulfillment of present but also of future needs. The idea that only humans have 
developed the capacity to anticipate future needs and drives is called the Bischof-Kohler 
hypothesis, and might be illustrated by the, admittedly over-simplified, claim that “while a full-
bellied lion is no threat to nearby zebras, a full-bellied human may well be” (Suddendorf 1994, 
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 Since writing this chapter I have been made aware of a manuscript by Bischof-Kohler (in press) in 
which she makes a similar argument and reports having found supporting correlations between the 
development of theory of mind and future-oriented behaviour (see also Moore et al. in press). 
p. 45). Humans, presumably from about age four onwards, can consider possible or likely future 
states of need and alter their current behaviour in accordance with these anticipations. 
The agent (the self) travels mentally in time (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997). A 
personal identity through time is the natural consequence by which the past, present, and future 
can be united under one umbrella. This is necessary to make the mental representations of past 
and future relevant to the present acting self. While we are changing dramatically in physical 
and mental make-up over time, all these stages are considered aspects of the same me. An 
extraordinary new structure appears to emerge: a sense of self that is not bound to time and 
body.3 
With understanding and reflecting upon own mental states also comes the ability to 
form attitudes about oneself. Self-esteem is an important aspect of the new personhood, and 
early developments might have long-lasting effects on a person’s life. More specifically, the 
child can now form attitudes about particular mental states such as: `I don’t like myself bossing 
others around’ or `I don’t want to know’. Metamind includes self-assessment and self-control. 
Metavolition (e.g. `my desire to play will not interfere with my concentration on work’) makes 
the child capable of governing its own motives (cf. Frankfurt 1988). Perner (1991) submitted 
that the observation that children around age four become `reasonable’ might not so much be a 
result of them becoming `logical’ (in concrete operational thinking) but of them becoming 
rational about their own desires. 
Mischel and colleagues (e.g. Mischel et al. 1989) demonstrated that by age four children 
can successfully delay gratification in order to receive a greater reward later. Choice between 
an immediate small and a delayed but greater reward clearly depends on the values of the 
rewards and the expected waiting time. However, other factors have been identified which are 
more relevant to the discussion of the impact of metamind. Exposure to the reward decreased 
average delay time for the children, and so did thinking about the reward versus thinking about 
something else. Disengaging from the primary representation of the reward and from one’s 
desire for it increased self-control. Focusing on abstract qualities of the reward or exposure to 
the image of rather than the actual rewards also increased delay. In fact, merely imagining that 
the actually exposed reward was an image increased delay time. These findings support the idea 
that mental disengagement is crucial for executive control of the metamind and that 
abstractions (e.g., through symbolic representation) improve this ability. 
Only the great apes have proven that they understand what they look like in the mirror 
self-recognition test. But whether they have evolved mental time-travel and a personal identity 
through time is highly questionable. Although apes have good memory (e.g. Fouts and Fouts 
1993) and planning skills (e.g. Boesch and Boesch 1984), analysis of the existing evidence 
suggests that they do not have an autobiographic memory and are not capable of anticipating 
future drives (Suddendorf 1994; Suddendorf and Corballis 1997). Chimpanzees have shown 
considerable skill in delaying gratification (e.g. de Waal 1982) and Boysen and Berntson (1995) 
showed how symbols can help them to gain executive control to override impulsive responses: 
Chimpanzees who had great difficulty in choosing a smaller pile of sweets in order to obtain a 
larger one found the task much easier when the piles were replaced with numerical symbols. 
Language and metamind evolution seem to be linked on several planes. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that great apes did not invent symbols by which to override impulses or to 
communicate with others, even if they can use symbols which we invent and teach to them. 
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 Povinelli et al. (1996) have studied a variant of the mirror self-recognition test by showing children 
a three-minute-old video recording of themselves being unknowingly marked with a sticker on their 
foreheads. On being showed the video, most four-year-olds removed the mark, while only a minority 
of three-year-olds did, leading Povinelli (1995) to conclude that, although a present sense of self 
might exist by age two, a time-travelling sense of self does not emerge until about age four. However 
my own research, while confirming this result, showed that a similar paradigm involving the 
introduction of an unexpected object in the room, rather than an unexpected sticker in the child’s hair, 
yielded the same pattern of results. This study raises doubts as to whether the video test has any 
bearing on the concept of self (Suddendorf, unpublished manuscript, 1997). 
 
Metamind and symbols: the connection between self and others 
 
Zaitchik (1990) showed that three-year-olds have problems understanding not only mental 
misrepresentations but also physical misrepresentations. In an analogue of the classical false-
belief task, Zaitchik asked children about a photograph of a previous situation that had now 
been altered. Three-year-olds expected the photo to represent the current situation while four-
year-olds understood that the photo was of the past situation. A metamind explanation of this 
finding may be that three-year-olds cannot yet disengage from the current situation and fail to 
understand the photo as representing the situation as it was before the change. On the other 
hand, these tasks might not require metarepresentation because the pictures are true 
representations of the past, rather than false representations of the present, and indeed 
performance is not correlated with false-belief tasks (Perner 1995). However, Thomas et al. 
(1994) showed that young children have severe problems with the representational nature of 
pictures. Appearance-reality distinctions for pictures were found to be as difficult as classic 
appearance-reality tasks. Young pre-schoolers have difficulty simultaneously representing the 
distinct properties of picture and depicted (Robinson et al. 1994).  
Similarly, `false maps’ and `false drawings’ are only understood by around age four 
(Charman and Baron-Cohen 1992; Leslie and Thaiss 1992). Understanding these `false’ 
symbolic representations might imply metamind, because the symbol needs to be brought into 
relation with an internal memory representation of the previous situation, and might require 
disengagement from the current perception and metarepresentational tagging as `past’ or as 
`false’. Symbolic representation, like mental representation, is understood only once the 
individual acquires metamind. Parkin (1994) found a robust correlation between false-belief 
task performance (`where does P think X is?’) and a parallel false-symbol task involving a 
misleading direction sign (`where does this sign show X is?’). There is some evidence 
suggesting that physical misrepresentation is understood earlier than mental misrepresentation 
(e.g. Robinson et al. 1996), which is not really surprising when one considers that the former 
has a primary reality that can be examined (e.g. a photo), while the latter has no directly 
accessible medium. 
The most significant symbols are of course those involved in language. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that strong correlations between metamind tasks and language abilities 
have been reported. Fletcher-Flinn and Snelson (1997), for example, found an association 
between metalinguistic skills (that is, syllable segmentation and rhyming tasks) and false-belief 
task performance. Doherty (unpublished, cited in Perner 1995) found a similar association 
between synonym monitoring and false-belief tasks. In another study, Suddendorf and Fletcher-
Flinn (1996) found a strong correlation between verbal intelligence as measured by the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al. 1982) and false-belief understanding. One might 
argue that a particular level of linguistic skill is necessary to comprehend the false-belief task 
and that the correlation merely reflects this. However, Jenkins and Astington (1996) found an 
association with performance on the Test of Early Language Development (TELD, Hresko et al. 
1981) that appeared to go beyond this suggestion. While a certain level of language skill is 
required to pass false-belief tasks (98% of the children who passed at least one task scored 14 
or higher, while only 33% of children who failed on all tasks reached this level), the authors 
found a significant correlation between the number of different tasks passed and the TELD 
scores even when analysed only for those who were above the threshold of 14. This suggests a 
more fundamental relationship than passing a threshold. Some have argued that the ability to 
comprehend the recursive nature of syntax is also involved in false-belief tasks (e.g. Feldman 
1988), others point to semantic abilities involved in understanding metarepresentational terms 
such as remember, forget or surprise (Olson 1988; Lyon and Flavell 1994). Furthermore, 
pragmatic aspects of communication might be linked to false-belief task performance (Baron-
Cohen 1988). Whatever the exact connection to language, the two abilities are apparently 
linked. Bickerton (1995) has even argued that they are fundamentally the same. 
Plaut and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) have suggested a reason for this association that ties 
in closely with my interpretation of metamind. They appeal to the symbolic representation 
entailed by language as a mediating factor for false-belief task performance. They argue that 
symbolic representations need to be generated by the child that can effectively override the 
immediate reality bias of the present experience. In other words, disengagement from the 
immediate present is fostered by symbolic representation. This is supported by the above-
mentioned results of Boysen and Berntson’s (1995) study on chimpanzees’ increased executive 
control when confronted with numerals rather than treats. 
Gestural communication might have preceded vocal language in evolution (Hewes 1973; 
Corballis 1992; Goldin-Meadow and McNeill, this volume) and this capacity might have already 
depended on metamind. In a recent study we investigated whether there is an association between 
metamind (as measured by false-belief understanding) and gestural representation in the absence of 
real objects (Suddendorf et al. in press). Earlier research has identified two successive levels in the 
development of gestural representation: body-part-as-object (BPO) and imaginary object (IO) 
pantomimes (Overton and Jackson 1973; Boyatzis and Watson 1993; O’Reilly 1995). We found that 
when asked to pretend to perform a common action such as brushing teeth with a toothbrush, most 
children without metamind substitute a body part (finger) for the object. Children with metamind, 
however, significantly more often act as if there were an object (toothbrush) to interact with. 
Modelling such `imaginary object’ pantomimes to pre-metamind children did not improve their 
performance; they continued to use body parts as objects. Metamind appears to be important for 
imaginary object pantomime and thus gestural communication. 
But correlations do not tell us much about causal connections. We do not know whether 
language influenced the evolution of metamind or vice versa. Moreover, language is a prime example 
of how it can be misleading to reason from ontogeny to phylogeny. Children grow up in a verbal 
environment. Our forebears, on the other hand, must have invented language. To invent a symbolic 
representational system one has to have metarepresentation, because one has to understand symbols as 
representations. It is not surprising, then, that apes like the bonobo Kanzi, who grow up in a language 
environment, can learn language up to a level comparable to a two-year-old child (Savage-Rumbaugh 
et al. 1993), while chimpanzees in the wild have not invented such a linguistic system at all. 
Although their collating mind enables them to use symbols and interpret pictures or videos (e.g., 
Premack and Woodruff 1978), apes might not understand them as representations, and can therefore 
not invent a symbolic language or draw pictures that represent something. Premack and Premack 
(1983) went to elaborate lengths to teach their chimpanzees to utilize maps or scale models. All these 
efforts turned out to be fruitless, as not even identical rooms led the apes to look at the same baited 
place in the second room after discovering the treat in the first. The very idea that one thing represents 
the situation of another was beyond their grasp. However, there are at least two studies in which 
primates were quite successful at using video information about their enclosure (Menzel et al. 1978; 
Vauclair 1996), but it seems plausible that these animals mistook the video for reality (like a 
window), rather than understood the representational nature of the video. 
With metamind the child becomes capable of understanding that something is represented by 
self, others, and symbols. The world becomes an entirely different place to the child. The way the 
child thinks is revolutionized. 
 
Metamind and thought 
 
The tasks presented earlier already exemplify the new mental experiences of the child. There are 
dramatic new developments such as the conceptualization of one’s own and others’ minds, personal 
history and future, self concept and control. There are further ways in which the metamind 
changes the way the child interprets and understands the world. With metamind matures what 
Dennett (1987) calls the intentional stance, which is a way of interpreting the events in the 
world by invoking mental states such as intentions and beliefs, rather than physical or design 
explanations. Heider and Simmel (1944) showed in now classic experiments how humans tend 
to interpret the world in mental terms. They showed subjects a silent film in which geometric 
figures moved about and the subjects were asked to describe what they saw. Descriptions 
generally were based on ascribing intentions and agency to the shapes. Adopting the intentional 
stance is a helpful heuristic in describing and understanding the world. Explanations often 
appear to have a wider appeal when proposed as narratives and when they anthropomorphize. 
Cultural mythologies are ample evidence for this inclination. This might well be due to the 
Machiavellian origin of human intelligence. 
When this view is coupled with other aspects of metamind such as mental timetravel, it 
seems inevitable that teleology (cf. Kelemen, this volume) emerges. This is the idea that the 
things around us are here for some purpose. Adopting this view must have been of momentous 
adaptive value for our ancestors, as it encouraged the search for new uses of objects in the 
environment and thus must have fostered human control over events. Human cultures have 
experimented with many religious and natural technologies to influence significant events, 
sometimes successfully (e.g. making fire) and sometimes not (e.g. making rain). Predicting the 
future, one of the main features of metamind, is of course most reliable when one is shaping the 
future. The natural curiosity of our species had therefore been extended into a new era. In 
childhood, too, this teleological stance becomes increasingly (sometimes irritatingly) obvious 
when the child asks more and more questions about why or what for. Every detail of the world is 
investigated as to its function and purpose. Understanding the world on the explicit metalevel 
becomes one of our main preoccupations. You and I are devoting significant parts of our lives 
to this quest for knowledge-why else would I write and you read this chapter? And if you 
attempt to answer this question, you could be said-thanks to the virtue of recursive thought-to 
be on yet another teleological quest. 
Complementary to generating questions through knowing `that’ and `what’ we do not 
know is generating answers through knowing `that’ and `what’ we do know. This 
metaknowledge can be very beneficial in the way knowledge is utilized. Metarepresentation 
and disengaging from present perception may be crucial for creative problem solving. Actively 
searching the knowledge base beyond currently activated areas of mental content appears to be 
at the very heart of divergent thinking. In our own research we have found that three- to four-
year-old children who passed false-belief tasks were able to generate more items on creativity 
tests requiring them to generate ideas or items according to given criteria (Suddendorf and 
Fletcher-Flinn 1997). In a recent longitudinal study we then showed that children improve in 
divergent thinking once they pass theory of mind tasks (Suddendorf and Fletcher-Flinn, in 
press). 
Divergent thinking, like language, requires informational access to varied domains of 
knowledge in the generative process of combining and recombining items into virtually infinite 
numbers of novel sequences. This generativity has been recognized as unique to the human 
condition (Corballis 1991). Metamind might have been crucial to the emergence of this important feat. 
Even apparently intelligent behaviour in animals is often characterized by a lack of transfer or 
flexibility. Non-human primates that act `intelligently’ in one domain fail to transfer their knowledge to 
another-they have a ‘laser-beam intelligence’ (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). With metamind this domain 
specificity may be overcome. “Flexible transfer of knowledge between different domains is one of the 
hallmarks of humans’ relentless creativity and invention” (Suddendorf and Fletcher-Flinn 1997, p. 67). 
 
 
Is metamind domain general or modular? Evidence from autism 
 
While some authors agree with the proposal of an across-the-board cognitive change (e.g. Perner 1991; 
Gopnik 1993), others have suggested the existence of domain-specific modules. In particular a theory-
of-mind module, specific to understanding mental representation, has been proposed (Leslie and Thaiss 
1992; Baron-Cohen 1995, this volume). The argument for a specific mind-reading module derived 
from the finding that autistic children fail theory-of-mind tasks while passing other tasks that are 
seemingly identical except that they require physical rather than mental representations (e.g., false 
photographs, drawings, and models-Leekam and Perner 1991; Charman and Baron-Cohen 1992, 
1995). 
But are autistic children deficient only in understanding mental representations? Perhaps the 
physical representations in these experiments were not really equivalent to mental representations. 
Physical representations are not only propositions about referents but also external real things 
themselves. So while they might misrepresent the current situation, they are themselves true existing 
objects in their own right. Perhaps it is easier to learn about their properties without invoking 
metarepresentation because they, in contrast to mental states, have a physical existence. In other words 
autistic children, even though lacking metamind, might learn to pass these non-mental tasks indirectly 
without metarepresentation. For example, the autistic children might have learned that photographs are 
stable and unchanging in nature, while the three-year-olds generalize, apply their immature 
representational understanding, and believe that what is happening in reality is also happening in the 
photograph (Leekam and Perner 1991; Robinson et al. 1994). Most studies match control and autistic 
sample according to mental age. This disguises the fact that the autistic sample is much older and thus 
has had much more opportunity to learn contingencies between observables. High functioning autistic 
people appear to solve many tasks through indirect computation of what `comes naturally’ to clinically 
normal people. For an autistic person, emotional states may not simply be perceived in somebody else’s 
face, but need to be deduced on the basis of observed covariations between facial cues and behaviour. In 
other words, autistic children might learn via association and reward where normal children are applying 
pre-programmed shortcuts. Indeed, autistic children appear to tackle emotional and social problems in 
much the same dry way as they address mathematical problems (Sigman et al. 1995). In some respects 
autistic people seem to be behaviourists in a mentalists’ society (cf. Baron-Cohen 1989). 
While autistic children show evidence for a collating mind, through, for example, mirror self-
recognition (Dawson and McKissick 1984) and pretend play (V. Lewis and Boucher 1988), there is a 
lack of evidence for metamind. Besides consistently failing classic theory-of-mind tasks (Baron-Cohen 
et al. 1985; Leslie and Frith 1988; BaronCohen 1989; Perner et al. 1989; Prior et al. 1990), autistic 
children do not seem to develop autobiographic memory (Boucher and Warrington 1976; Boucher and 
Lewis 1989; Powell and Jordan 1993), have severe problems with mental disengagement and executive 
control (Ozonoff et al. 1991; Hughes and Russell 1993; Hughes et al. 1994), lack generativity in pretend 
play (Jarrold et al. 1996), have problems imagining unreal things (Scott and Baron-Cohen 1996), have a 
gross language-acquisition deficit (Sigman and Ungerer 1984), are characteristically engaging in 
stereotyped and routinized actions rather than flexible planned behaviour (e.g. Prior and Hoffman 1990; 
Harris 1991), and are basically acultural (Loveland 1991). Autistic children seem to lack executive 
control and skills in regards to knowledge about self, about others, symbols and thought. In other words 
they appear to lack a metamind. 
Even if mental attribution can be dissociated from other metamind skills in the autistic 
condition, metamind may still have evolved as a single capacity applied to varied modules. The theory-
of-mind aspect might be a subsystem that can be disturbed while other parts remain intact. One reason to 
assume that metamind is a domain-general skill (or module) is the lack of evidence that any part of 
metamind exists in other species. The case would be further strengthened if it could be shown that the 
different components of metamind co-emerged in evolution. 
 
Some words of caution 
 
Although I have referred to `pre-metamind’ and used expressions like “once the child acquires 
metamind”, this development is of course not as abrupt as these words suggest. Children who pass some 
metamind tasks continue to fail others (Jenkins and Astington 1996). Further, the test-retest reliability of 
false-belief tasks has been judged to be low to moderate (Mayes et al. 1996)-although it depends of 
course on the age range considered, because two-year-olds will always fail and five, six, seven, or eight-
year-olds will reliably pass. Thus, there appears to be no clear transition point; rather, we should assume 
that there is a transition period. Indeed, abilities entailed by metamind continue to develop throughout 
childhood, and indeed we appear never to stop learning about people’s minds. It is all the more 
surprising, then, that we do find robust associations between false-belief-task performance and various 
other skills such as imaginary object pantomime and creativity. The gradual change seems to produce a 
qualitative shift during this transition period. 
The stark difference between monkeys and great apes might also be softened in future by more 
intensive studies of the lesser apes. Non-primate species (such as parrots and sea mammals) might also 
turn out to show sophisticated skills, reminding us that evolution is more like a tree branching in all 
directions than a ladder pointing to heaven. 
While the sum of correlational evidence paints a picture of a domain-general metamind faculty 
emerging around age four, this is not certain. Even partialling out age and 10 does not entirely eliminate 
the worrisome fact that most things develop at this age period-and that correlations between skills are to 
be expected. Indeed, most of the experimental data reviewed, especially the comparative research, is 
mined with qualifications and reservations. Overall, however, the trends in the data can be assembled 
into an account that makes evolutionary sense, even if the model I am advancing is in some respects 
merely a `just so’ story. Ultimately, the findings from developmental and comparative research have to 
fit into a coherent evolutionary theory. The model I present is a first attempt. 
 
 
When did metamind come on to the scene? 
 
Since no other animal has developed metamind, we might reasonably assume that it evolved some time 
after the phylogenetic split from the line that led to modern chimpanzees some five million years ago. 
The prime candidates for introducing this new cognitive machinery are Homo erectus and ergaster. We 
do not have evidence suggesting any major changes in mental capacity among the australopithecines (5 
to 2 million years ago), as there are no artefacts and their relative brain size did not exceed that of the 
apes (Wood 1992). At the other end of the time scale, the oldest representational art is about 35 000 
years old and burials are up to 100 000 years old. The recent discovery of sophisticated 400 000 year-
old spears in Germany (Thieme 1997) prove much earlier extensive planning skills (suggesting mental 
time-travel). The emergence of metamind thus appears to lie somewhere between two million and 
400000 years ago. 
Around two million years ago (perhaps even two and a half million, according to Semaw et al. 
1997) we have the beginning of the Homo clade with slightly increased brain size and the first stone 
tools (Corballis, this volume). These early tools, however, seem to be within the capacity of 
chimpanzees (Wynn and McGrew 1989; Toth et al. 1993) and there are no other hints of metamind. 
This changes with the emergence of H. ergaster/erectus some two million years ago. 
Donald (1991, 1993, this volume) proposed the perhaps most plausible psychological account 
of the emergence of H. erectus/ergaster. At the centre of what he calls mimetic culture stands a new 
level of motor skill, which allows the whole body to be used as a communication and representation 
device. Crucial to such bodily or gestural communication would have been an ability to represent 
imaginary objects. Imaginary object pantomime, as argued above, is associated with metamind. Another 
aspect emphasized by Donald is the capacity for autocueing. The individual became able to consciously 
stop, replay, and edit bodily movement and thereby gain voluntary access to memory. Intentional 
rehearsal and refinement enabled H. ergaster/erectus to begin developing intentional symbolic 
communication and culture. Autocueing is crucial to free recall and episodic memory which are also 
implicated in metamind (Perner and Ruffman 1995). 
But what is the `hard’ evidence for metamind in H. ergaster/erectus? The hardest evidence, literally, is 
that deriving from stone tools. While the Oldowan tools associated with H. habilis can be produced 
quickly, and were possibly used `on the spot’, H. ergaster’s Acheulian tool kit implies some 
premeditation. The production of a symmetrical bifacial hand-axe requires time and precision. A tool 
like that would not be manufactured for one-time, on-the-spot use and it has thus been taken as 
evidence for mental time-travel (Suddendorf 1994; Suddendorf and Corballis 1997). Not only 
must the future need be anticipated, but the persistence and uniformity of this tool culture 
implies instructed cultural learning based on metamind. 
Another line of evidence is the relatively sudden first wave of migration of H. erectus 
from Africa across the old world. This suggests that H. erectus were capable of altering the 
various environments to their distinct needs, although they had not developed the Acheulian 
tool kit of their African relatives H. ergaster. In practice this might have meant quick adaptation 
to different food resources, clothing for colder climates, and eventually fire for heat, light, 
cooking, and defence (the earliest evidence of the use of fire is about 500 000 years old). These 
things could not have been achieved without a metamind and without the evolving mimetic 
culture with generative thought and gestural communication. The origins of human cultural 
universals such as morality, justice, religion, language, narrative, mythology etc., might then go 
as far back as the emergence of the mental machinery I have called metamind. 
The arrival of H. sapiens on the scene some 150 000 years ago probably brought with it a 
vocal apparatus capable of transforming the gestural communication systems of their forebears 
into speech. But it took yet another representational revolution to catapult humanity into a 
position from which the extraordinary development to world domination could begin. Only five 
thousand years ago did we begin to utilize our understanding of mental and vocal 
representational systems to create lasting symbolic representations. We invented writing. This 
external memory storage allowed cultures to share their knowledge across space and time (cf. 
Donald 1991). The consequential rapid accumulation of information was embraced and utilized 
for the erection of magnificent cultures such as that of the Egyptians where science, art, 
agriculture, astronomy, religion, and architecture flourished to new heights. Our current techno-
logical leap is a continuation of this process of extended use of external memory storage into 
our computer age. 
With the help of external memory storage we can still today reflect on the reflections of 
a long-dead Frenchman. Descartes’ cogito implies a self-awareness firmly seated in the present. 
With an evolutionary approach that includes the human species, indeed the human mind, our 
self-awareness can go far beyond the immediately present. We can realize that we are only a 
link in our species’ evolution with a long past and, hopefully, a long future. 
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